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I. Introduction
Few, if anyone, would impugn the claim that Engelhardt’s seminal contribution to contemporary bioethical and generally philosophical debates is that extensive, that it resists all attempts to fully grasp it; beyond 
a shadow of a doubt, numerous scholars will commit themselves to evaluating his 
overall input and it is in this context of post mortem tribute that this paper would 
like to situate itself. When embarking on decoding his thought and reading his 
books and numerous articles, one has to carefully address two major difficulties. 
The first lies in the fact that Engelhardt articulates his arguments drawing from 
a vast philosophical, theological and medical tradition, while his knowledge 
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of Western history and culture is equally formidable.1 Such a mastery is rarely 
found, hence though admirable, it makes it very difficult for anyone to assess 
the synthesis that stems from its employment. Besides, the currently dominant 
views on how scholarship should be carried out explicitly favor specialization in 
a usually narrow field, thus complicating the fruitful reception of more ambitious 
and demanding academic endeavors. The second challenge results from the very 
philosophical and spiritual assumptions of his work. More specifically, it is known 
that, while some of his books and articles adopt a purely secular argumentative 
line, others bring out a passionately defended religious commitment – one 
that foreseeably leads to normative conclusions diametrically opposed to the 
secular ones. Self-evidently upsetting as it is for all his readers, this twofold 
approach, both secular and religious, demands a very delicate handling by anyone 
approaching Engelhardt’s thought and poses intricate interpretive difficulties.2
Therefore, focusing on a particular set of arguments pertaining to to a 
specific field of scholarly interest or even to a specific concept, seems quite 
wise an option, albeit not too daring. In this regard, this paper will briefly 
discuss a rather neglected topic, that is the humans-animals conceptual pair, 
which will be examined in the light of two distinct perspectives. The first will 
elaborate on some secular- oriented theses of Engelhardt on the proper attitude 
of humans towards animals, the latter having risen to the center of many 
philosophers’ attention during the past decades. My pivotal aim will be to 
critically reconstruct his arguments in support of animal use and experimentation, 
since he is notorious for totally rejecting animal rights.3 In trying to slightly 
moderate his claims, I will explore and invoke other secular accounts on the 
same issue, which, though equally hesitant to acknowledge certain rights, 
nevertheless do resort to middle-level claims about the value of nature and 
offer insights into our motivation to respect and preserve nature as a whole. 
The second point that I will raise is related to the notion of animality, examined 
from the human point of you, and not so much to animals themselves. I should 
clarify that this second section will make use both of secular and religious ideas 
expounded by Engelhardt. My objective will be to build upon his suggestion that 
humanity is gradually immersing itself in a spirituality-hostile culture, which is 
radically anti-metaphysical and aspires to ultimately transform humanity into a 
consumerist species, that is a merely sentient animal. What I am going to hint 
1 Laurence B. McCullough, “Foreward: A Professional and Personal Portrait of H. Tristram 
Engelhardt, Jr.”, in Reading Engelhardt: Essays on the Thought of H. Tristram Engelhardt, ed. 
Brendan B. Minogue, Gabriel Palmer-Fernandez and James E. Reagan (Dordrecht: Springer, 
1997), xii-xvii.
2 Walter S. Davis, “Book Review: H. Tristram Engelhardt, Jr., The Foundations of Christian Bio-
ethics, Swets and Zeitlinger, 2000”, Theoretical Medicine 23 (2002): 97-100.
3 David B. Morris, “Animal Pain: The Limits of Meaning”, in Meanings of Pain, ed. Simon Van 
Rysewyk (Cham: Springer, 2016), 396.
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is that, despite the fact that such an estimation is not unduly expressed, science 
and technology will to a significant extent substitute for the old, classical 
transcendent tradition in becoming humanity’s wholly new quasi-religious vision.
II. The permissibility of animal use 
During the past decades, there has been a growing interest in the philosophical 
delegitimization of animal use, regardless of whether animals are used for medical 
experimentation, cosmetic testing or simply for food. Peter Singer and other 
widely recognizable thinkers pioneer in this field, indicating that animal equality 
is unjustifiably violated by numerous human undertakings.4 They assert that, since 
human and non-human animals share the capability of sentience, no discrimination 
against the latter is morally tenable.5 Others, while they question the moral status 
of animals, consider respectful treatment as a moral obligation of rational humanity 
towards animals.6 On the opposite side, Engelhardt’s secular morality presents three 
mutually supportive arguments that are destined to ground the moral superiority 
of humans and their derivative right to use animals in order to meet their needs and 
preferences.
The first argument takes as starting point the character of morality itself, 
namely the fact that its origin is strictly human, at least as far as secular morality is 
concerned. In the absence of any other rational beings except for human persons, it 
follows that humans are the only beings capable of constructing reflective judgements 
concerning their conduct. The very notion of reflectively judging in the robust sense 
of the term is equally a human privilege. Hence, human conduct cannot be criticized 
and condemned, cannot be reformed or ameliorated, but by humans.7 It seems, 
then, that secular morality ‘suffers’ from a certain self-referentiality. The latter’s 
negative consequence lies in the fact that in the end no fully grounded and world-
widely accepted secular morality can be unearthed, because this undertaking would 
presuppose a preexisting consent on how competing moral principles and visions of 
the good should be ranked.8 That moral pluralism is irresolvable is also thematized 
4 Peter Singer, Animal Liberation: A New Ethics for Our Treatment of Animals (New York: Open 
Road Media, 2015); also Peter Singer, “All Animals Are Equal”, in Animal Rights: Past and 
Present Perspectives, ed. Evangelos D. Protopapadakis, 163-178 (Berlin: Logos Verlag, 2012). 
5 Onora O’ Neill, “Environmental Values, Anthropocentrism and Speciesism”, Environmental 
Values 6, no. 2 (1997): 127-142. 
6 See Evangelos D. Protopapadakis, “Animal Rights or Just Human Wrongs?”, in Animal Ethics: 
Past and Present Perspectives, ed. Evangelos D. Protopapadakis, 279-291 (Berlin: Logos Verlag, 
2012).
7 H. Tristram Engelhardt, Jr., “Animals: Their Right to Be Used”, in Why Animal Experimentation 
Matters: The Use of Animals in Medical Research, ed. Ellen Frankel Paul and Jeffrey Paul (New 
Brunswick, London: Transaction Publishers, 2001), 175-185.
8 David E. Guinn, “Religion and Bioethics in the Public Sphere”, in Handbook of Bioethics and 
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in human rights debates, within which it is recognized that reaching a philosophically 
justified catalogue of human rights constitutes a task difficult to accomplish, given 
the variety and divergence of existing accounts of the human good.9
However, the self-referential character of morality has also a positive effect. 
More specifically, Engelhardt argues that, morality being human-centered and 
absent any other beings capable of reflection, its quintessence lies in that all 
actions in need of moral consideration will be deemed from an exclusively human 
perspective. In a nutshell, only humans can judge themselves for the ways they 
treat animals and this moral judgment is interwoven with, or rather will take into 
account, any possible contribution of animals to human life, health, prosperity, 
and traditional cultural rituals. It may be that in the West many people are 
religiously indifferent and scorn their cultural heritage, but other centuries-old 
cultures (Confucianism for example) around the world that survived secularism and 
retained their vivacity use animals for ritual reasons.10 In such cases, animals are 
not malevolently used, but are regarded as means for the faithful accomplishment 
of a certain ritual performance, which consolidates community’s connection 
with the past and attests to its willingness to preserve its cultural particularity. 
By the same token, the issue of testing future medicines on animals provides 
another indicative example, indeed one citizens in the West are more familiar 
with. This is not to deny that animals feel pain and suffer during these testings, 
but rather that all these regrettable collateral damages are morally examined in 
the light of the expected profit of these trials, which could hopefully result in the 
alleviation of human pain, the prolongation of human life and the improvement 
of its quality. Engelhardt does not claim that this is the right thing to do; rather, 
he explains that a secular morality has nowhere to resort to so as to ground the 
impermissibility of causing pain to animals, because it lacks a convincing account 
of the reasons why animal pain should impede the elimination of human pain. 
The above strategy is closely connected with another aspect of Engelhardt’s 
argumentation. This second claim is of Kantian origin and expounds the idea that 
only humans are ends in themselves, hence animals, not being ends in themselves, 
can nevertheless be used as means contributing to humanity’s well-being. Following 
Kant’s fundamental assumptions, he asserts that agency, that is competence for 
reflective, rational and coherently articulated action, is only achieved by humans 
and that it is in this exceptional attribute that humanity’s superiority is to be 
found and grounded. Only humans are able to recognize themselves as free moral 
agents accountable for their actions. The self-consciousness of moral freedom 
Religion, ed. David E. Guinn (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 126-127. 
9 Onora O’ Neill, Autonomy and Trust in Bioethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2002), 74-77. 
10 H. Tristram Engelhardt, Jr., “How a Confucian Perspective Reclaims Moral Substance: An 
Introduction”, Dao: A Journal of Comparative Philosophy 9, no.1 (2010): 3-9.
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and responsibility distinguishes humans from animals, since the former are aware 
of their ability to overcome what nature dictates and comply with the principles 
of moral autonomy. It is from the awareness of this ontological competence 
that stems our ‘right’ to morally evaluate human actions.11 When judging one’s 
actions, we just state that things should have been done in another (moral) way 
and we take it for granted that they could have been otherwise. The very concept 
of moral philosophy would be inconceivable, if it had not been for this elementary 
ontological prerequisite, namely that humans do have the freedom of moral choice. 
The normative conclusion drawn from the above strategy is that human rights 
enjoy a deontological priority against the interests of animals (as for example the 
interest to avoid pain) and cannot be equated with them. Nonetheless, no right to 
malevolent actions is recognized12, first because malevolence implies an overall 
rejection of morality itself and, second, because animal maltreatment undermines 
one’s ability to respect humanity and act in accordance with the moral law. If we 
shift from a more or less reasonable animal use to intentional viciousness, then 
persons are inescapably going to be our next victims. This Kantian-inspired remark 
suggests the continuity of morality and dispels the illusion that the corruption of 
our sentimental world due to animal maltreatment will not infringe on the realm 
of purely human interaction. In Engelhardt’s words: “We owe to persons both 
respect and beneficent regard. To animals we owe only beneficent regard.”13 
The self-reflective character of human nature provides the basis for the 
third argument as well, but in what follows it will not be correlated to a certain 
aspect of the transcendental subject, but rather to our empirical self. A major and 
intuitively strong argument against animal use is that animals, as sentient beings, 
have feelings similar to ours. This common sentient background, it is usually said, 
should be interpreted as a moral constraint; pain and pleasure, in other words, 
are conditions shared both by humans and animals and, consequently, deserve an 
equal moral consideration. On the contrary, Engelhardt shows that this common 
empirical background is subject to incommensurably divergent appropriations. 
Human pain and pleasure are not just the outcome of a merely sensory stimulation, 
whose imprint is destined to gradually vanish. They are constitutive parts of one’s 
bio-history and are incorporated in the reflectively constructed narrative of her 
life. This approach admits of further elaboration. Indeed, the value of these 
experiences is not simply empirical, as is the case with animals. What makes them 
indispensable for our self-recognition is the fact that, taken as a whole, they 
11 Engelhardt, “Animals: Their Right to Be Used”, 188-191.
12 Christopher Tollefsen, “Missing Persons: Engelhardt and Abortion”, in At the Roots of Chris-
tian Bioethics: Critical Essays on the Thought of H. Tristram Engelhardt, Jr., ed. Ana Smith Iltis 
and Mark J. Cherry (Massachusetts: M & M Scrivener Press, 2010), 172-173. 
13 H. Tristram Engelhardt, Jr., The Foundations of Bioethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1996), 144-145.
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represent the development of our life. All these experiences, though retaining 
their origin from the empirical realm, are somehow cut off from it and transformed 
into a higher level, within which pain and pleasure are conceptually translated 
into various meanings, such as happiness, felicity, disappointment, anxiety, fear 
of death, anticipation etc. Human sentience, then, is much more delicate and 
refined than that of animals; it facilitates the reception of the external world 
whose content, transmitted through our senses, is all the more meaningful as it is 
subject to a creative, non-mechanical, interpretation.14 The internalization of the 
external world and its understanding in the light of our rational and emotional 
undertakings enriches and normatively upgrades human experience, since the latter 
is placed within the realm of human culture and determines the self-reflective 
evaluation of our life. As self-conscious beings, we place pleasure and pain within 
a wider meaningful context, which remains inaccessible to animals.15 Human 
right-claims are ultimately reduced to the uniquely human awareness that our 
life has a past and turns to the future with rationally constructed expectations. 
III. Moral Realism and Critical Interests 
The above description of Engelhardt’s blatantly anthropocentric attitude 
should not be taken as reflecting an unmitigated hostility against animals or 
an unjustified, relentless prioritization of humanity. First, because these are 
not the views Engelhardt himself embraces, given his religious commitment 
and the totally different stance it suggests. Second, because they are typical 
of a great deal of secular moral philosophers, who reject the accusation 
of speciesism and underline the distinctiveness of human experience. In 
this section, my main objective will be, first, to examine some of the less 
intuitively attractive conclusions previously described from the perspective 
of value realism, as expressed by Ronald Dworkin, and, second, to use his 
notion of critical interests in support of Engenlhardt’s third argument. 
Life’s Dominion has arguably made a tremendously influential contribution 
that revolutionized public debates on abortion and euthanasia. Nevertheless, 
despite the fact that its scope does not openly raise environmental concerns, 
there are some hints worth attending to. In its crucial third chapter on sanctity, 
Dworkin makes an allusion to nature and claims that “in our culture, we tend 
to treat distinct animal species (though not individual animals) as sacred. 
We think it very important, and worth considerable economic expense, to 
protect endangered species from destruction at human hands or by a human 
enterprise. [..] We see the evolutionary process through which species were 
14 Engelhardt, “Animals: Their Right to Be Used”, 185-188.
15 H. Tristram Engelhardt, “Bioethics and the Process of Embodiment”, Perspectives in Biology 
and Medicine 18, no. 4 (1975): 486-500.
http://epublishing.ekt.gr | e-Publisher: EKT | Downloaded at 20/02/2020 23:32:10 |
[ 25 ]
CONATUS • JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY VOLUME 3, ISSUE 2 • 2018
developed as itself contributing, in some way, to the shame of what we do 
when we cause their extinction now. Indeed, people who are concerned to 
protect threatened species often stress the connection between art and nature 
themselves by describing the evolution of species as a process of creation.”16
I find Dworkin’s account very attractive especially when it comes to the moral 
evaluation of hunting. In Engelhardt’s Texan cultural context hunting as a leisure 
activity may be an established practice that no one would consider questioning. 
However, using animals to advance medicine and killing them in order to exhibit 
our hunting skills or mitigate our harshness do not seem to bear any substantial 
moral affinity. Dworkin rejects all skeptical challenges against morality and 
calls attention to the fact that our concerns about protecting and preserving 
nature can be explained through his notion of sanctity. The latter admits either 
secular-darwinian or religious grounding depending on the convictions of each 
individual. Let us invoke the paradigm of the Siberian tiger or of white lions. 
Mesmerizing and impressive, these animals bear witness to a creative process 
that we are unable to imitate. Their beauty and strength instill into our soul 
a sense of awe, accompanied with reasonable fear. But putting fear aside, we 
cannot but admire their exotic colors, their commanding look, their predatory 
skills and velocity. One could turn to more elegant examples (such as red 
panda or deer) and enumerate other aspects of their way of being that stir a 
certain moral objection or repulsion against their destruction. What lies at 
the core of this approach is the call to respect what eludes our competence 
to reconstruct it. Animal species and the beauties of nature encompass an 
aesthetic excellence and a history of creative development that motivates us 
to protect it, at least avoid its uncritical and mindless waste, without involving 
ourselves in sticky questions about rights, balancing of interests etc. In this 
regard, a refined mentality marked by self-restraint is to be gradually shaped.
I will now explore another aspect of Dworkin’s argumentation, which seems 
to support Engelhardt’s view on the outstanding character of human experience. 
The former’s thought is steered by the aspiration to bring out the reasons that 
justify the so-called ‘right to death’, that is the right of patients who suffer from 
unspeakable pains and whose medical condition is irreversible to be allowed to die 
and, additionally, to receive from their doctor the aid they need in order to achieve 
this goal. Thus, Dworkin claims that advance directives and euthanasia protect 
individuals’ “critical interests”, which are opposed to the purely experiential 
interests: “But most people think that they also have what I shall call critical 
interests: interests that it does make their life genuinely better to satisfy, interests 
they would be mistaken, and genuinely worse off, if they did not recognize. 
Convictions about what helps to make a life good on the whole are convictions 
16 Ronald Dworkin, Life’s Dominion: An Argument about Abortion, Euthanasia and Individual 
Freedom (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1993), 75-76. 
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about those more important interests. They represent critical judgments rather 
than just experiential preferences. Most people enjoy and want close friendships 
because they believe that such friendships are good, that people should want 
them. I have many opinions about what is good for me in that critical sense.”17
The notion of critical interests provides us with an alternative insight into the 
meaning and relative weight of our sensory exchanges with the world. I will focus 
on the issue of pain, which is also crucial for those supporting animal rights. In 
Dworkin’s analysis, it is only through the mediation of critical interests that one 
can reach an understanding of the meaning of death.18 These interests do not only 
depict the evaluative priorities we embraced in the course of our life, but they equally 
reflect our judgements on how we should die. For many people, living in a persistent 
vegetative state with no self-consciousness and devoid of all life’s attractions is 
an abhorrent prospective that would destroy in retrospect their critical interests. 
Patients at the end of life may feel intolerable pains and experience suffering 
beyond any description. This condition, if examined in the light of Dworkin’s 
distinction between “critical” and “experiential” interests, is not comparable to 
the pains felt by animals. The most significant aspect of human suffering is not 
that it attacks our body nor that it impedes our vital functions. Rather, it lies in 
that indescribable suffering violates our human dignity as self-conscious authors 
of our life and marks our failure to live up to our critical interests. A humiliating 
death and an agonizing pre-death period stain our life’s narrative. These external 
and empirical adversities, then, invade our inner self as rational beings and their 
detrimental effect threatens to eliminate our efforts to lead a critically examined 
life. A liberal state, Dworkin claims, properly respects individual freedom only 
by acknowledging that each person has a right to determine the conditions of 
her death. This does not mean that all citizens of democratic states will accord 
that the intolerable pain at the end of life deprives them of their dignity or that 
the loss of certain human capacities makes their life worthless. These evaluations 
are deeply personal, since the worth of each human life can be measured both 
objectively and subjectively. As a result, my impression is that Dworkin’s 
conceptual distinction has significant interpretive strength in environmental 
concerns as well, because, though indirectly, it offers an ontologically thin, but 
sufficiently clear, account of what differentiates animal from human experience. 
IV. Humanity in the post-modern era: Renouncing its moral standing and embracing 
animality
All previous sections were concerned with animals, strictly speaking, and 
with the arguments set in favor of humanity’s right to use them in its various 
17 Ibid, 201-202. 
18 Ibid, 208. 
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undertakings. Thus, a significant distinction was presupposed throughout the 
paper between animals and humans, the latter being attributed moral priority for 
various reasons. In my introductory observations, I suggested that for Engelhardt 
(and evidently this is not at all a revolutionary assertion) certain layers of animality 
can equally be found (and intensified, depending on the historical circumstances) 
in humans in the sense that human beings are prone to neglecting their soul, are 
vulnerable to pleasures and fail to diligently refine their most precious attributes. 
This position is formulated in the context of a thorough criticism of the 
current Western culture. He disputes the foundations of the dominant secular 
morality and offers a forceful description of the moral and spiritual disorientation 
that deters individuals from searching for God and responsibly shaping their 
life. Modern liberal societies have displaced religiosity from the public sphere 
and promote an “after God” culture, which underscores individual autonomy, 
holds in high regard sexual freedom and addresses in a superfluous way major 
moral issues, such as abortion, euthanasia, substitute maternity, complex and 
morally dubious reproductive options, human tissue market etc. In our post-
modern cultural environment, no ultimate moral truth can be grounded through 
the use of public reason and the Rawlsian proposal for reaching a reflective 
equilibrium is also deemed to be infeasible.19 Engelhardt’s main concern is the 
recession of spirituality and the massive blindness towards the pivotal human 
questions about the existence of God, the meaning of human life, the proper 
content of morality. These tendencies, which he imputes to the politically 
correct morality of Western Christianity and the gradual isolation of God 
from the major philosophical systems articulated in the course of modernity, 
are intensified by the secular doctrine that declares the ‘end of history’. The 
latter shall be precipitated by the relatively established economic prosperity 
enjoyed by Western citizens and the progressive eclipse of all metaphysical, 
ideological and transcendent inquiries. The thirst for truth, meaning and moral 
guidance is destined to be quenched, or rather replaced, with worldly pleasures. 
Provocative as it is, this description of our era is intended to show that, 
following Kojève’s insights, humanity will embrace animality in that the 
scope of its interests will only include the quest for individual eudemonia and 
economic security, an entrenched moral indifference and relativism, contempt of 
ideological quarrels and concerns about social justice, equality, rights etc.20 In 
other words, the long-established requirement of leading an examined life, which 
has determined the very essence of Western culture, will see the emergence of 
19 H. Tristram Engelhardt, Jr., “Bioethics Critically Reconsidered: Living after Foundations”, 
Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 33 (2012): 97-105. 
20 H. Tristram Engelhardt, Jr., After God: Morality and Bioethics in a Secular Age (New York: St 
Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 2014). This account is primarily based on the last chapter of Engel-
hardt’s last book, to which I had access only through its recent Greek translation. 
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another, less demanding, attitude. Hence, the emphasis is put rather on “life”, 
on its enhancement, enjoyment and prolongation, and not on the prerequisite 
of self-reflective examination and rationality. From an anthropological point 
of view, humanity is left without solid ontological roots and decisively rejects 
the eminence of its moral status, in full compliance with Singer’s doctrines. This 
turn to animality signifies an emaciation that inescapably gives life to crucial 
bioethical consequences.21 For example, the surge of interest for regenerative 
medicine, life prolongation, genetic enhancement and cosmetic improvements can 
be explained as expressing this increasingly growing adherence to the attractions 
abundantly found in the realm of immanence. In trying to secure the most 
rewarding life experiences, the Western world abandons its past metaphysical 
explorations and secular moral narratives, in order to comply with what I 
would call a “radical or insatiable empiricism”. Embracing animality, therefore, 
involves the shift of emphasis to the exaltation of our sensory capacities, that 
is to a more or less empirical self, devoted to the consumption of experiences 
and hesitant to commit itself to anything else but satisfaction and pleasure. 
The new, satisfaction-centered civilization that emerges marginalizes every 
longing for the transcendent, may that be the question about God or morality, 
and commits itself to securing immanent satisfactions for the “animal-man.”22
V. Conclusion-Final Remarks
What Engelhardt provides us with is the philosophical narrative of the estimated 
development of Western culture in the decades to come. Any talk about development 
in literal terms, however, is rather ungrounded for him, given that his conclusions 
are more or less congruent with the Neohegelian analysis on the end of history. It 
is now clear that in examining his rejection of animal rights in the first part of this 
paper, I only intended to underline that the current philosophical upheaval on the 
upgrade of animals’ moral status is indissolubly connected with the emergence of a 
thin anthropology, which is much less willing to escape from immanence and worldly 
lures. But is there anything that could undermine the above interpretive scheme and 
mark the end of the end of history? 
Engelhardt himself is fully aware of the fact that the significant demographic 
decline observed in the wealthy West, and especially within the European Union, 
along with the migration crisis are bound to challenge the beatitude of the West. 
Besides, solid, closely-knit communities of non-European immigrants and refugees 
21 H. Tristram Engelhardt, Jr., The Foundations of Christian Bioethics (Lisse: Swets & Zeitlinger, 
2000), 139. 
22 H. Tristram Engelhardt, Jr., “Re-reading Re-reading Engelhardt”, in At the Roots of Christian 
Bioethics: Critical Essays on the Thought of H. Tristram Engelhardt, Jr., ed. Anna Smith Iltis and 
Mark J. Cherry (Massachusetts: M & M Scrivener Press, 2010), 290-291. 
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are increasingly expanding across Europe owning to the political instability in the 
Middle East and other regions. Hence, the citizens of the more or less prosperous 
West are already confronted with pressing questions about policies of integration 
and solidarity, security and education issues etc. Equally disturbing and dreadful 
have been the persistent manifestations of the upcoming environmental crisis. 
Climate change, for which it is the Western world that should be held accountable, 
is reasonably expected to jeopardize current lifestyles and question our post-
modern culture’s certitude that the regard for the public sphere is merely optional 
and that one can live in total indifference to all communal and social concerns. 
As for the destiny of metaphysics and Engelhardt’s beloved spiritual tradition, 
all speculations are risky. For all that, it would not be premature to state that 
in our time science and state-of-the-art technology seem to be functioning as 
substitutes for the transcendent explorations he mourns. The longing for the 
unseen God has given its place to an equally passionate desire for the absolutely 
tangible fruits of modern technology, medicine and biotechnology, whose 
promising achievements are fervently welcomed with a quasi-religious eagerness. 
In this regard, the prospect of improving and enriching humanity’s gene pool23, 
the keenness to enhance our nature24 and the commitment to the long-awaited 
hope for the substantial prolongation (and even immortality25) of human 
life seem to serve, if I may say, as an “alternative metaphysics”; that is, they 
represent the “after God”, post-traditional doctrine that guides contemporary 
thought and, most importantly, governs humanity’s future aspirations. 
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